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Combat Service Support Elements (CSSEs) for the U.S. Marine Corps deploy with
a limited number of spare parts to keep the fighting unit at its highest level of readiness. Items
that are requested by the unit, but not carried by the CSSE, are backordered, resulting in
lower readiness and additional transportation costs. We show how to determine which items
the CSSE should take, and in what quantities, to best support a fighting unit. We have tested
our model on data from a recently deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and the
results suggest that the MEU could have experienced 13 percent fewer backorders and saved
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Unless combat forces are supported by a responsive and
fail-safe logistics system that can meet their needs under the
most adverse circumstances, their operations are doomed to
failure. It determines what is possible. Marines must be
experts at it, skilled at meeting the inordinate demands for
material, supplies, parts, maintenance, transportation - for
every category of combat service support. [Ref. l:p. 36]
The white papers "... From the Sea " and "Forward
.
. . From the Sea "delineate a new
approach to naval operations. Because this approach places an unprecedented emphasis
on littoral areas, those sea and land areas nearest a coastline, it requires more intimate
cooperation between forces afloat and forces ashore [Ref. 2:p. A.l]. This approach also
emphasizes the notion of the naval expeditionary force and provides the foundation for
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), a concept for the projection of naval
power ashore. The OMFTS concept most exclusively affects the United States Marine
Corps. As we enter the next century, OMFTS will increasingly guide the Marine Corps
in conducting amphibious assaults and in maneuvering directly to objective areas located
well inland, with logistics support provided from sea-based assets. The focus of OMFTS
is clearly on operational objectives with the sea as the maneuver space.
Since defenses against missiles are unlikely to be foolproof,
ports and air bases (indeed fixed sites of all kinds) will be
increasingly vulnerable. So logistical chains will be harder
to sustain, which means that expeditionary forces will need
to carry more of their supplies with them. Warriors and
their machines will find stealth and mobility more useful
than armour. [Ref. 3: p. 22]
Increased mobility makes expeditionary forces less vulnerable to the enemy. Tied to
this mobility is the concept of the "footprint," the size of the logistics infrastructure. Since
a unit with a large footprint is more easily detected by the enemy, it is to the unit's
advantage to leave minimal or, ideally, no footprint.
Increasing mobility by reducing the logistics footprint is an important part of OMFTS.
There is now a movement away from traditional amphibious assault operations, where
heavy build-up ashore was the norm. The move is due to the emerging missions facing our
amphibious forces today. Today's most probable conflicts lie in the Third World. The
missions that our forces will face require "rapid planning and execution with precisely
metered forces and will not involve any form of shore based logistical support" [Ref. l:p.
40].
The traditional amphibious assault operations placed a burden on commanders, whose
mobility was reduced by having to defend large logistics facilities ashore. Since increased
mobility necessitates a smaller cache of supplies for .deployed armed forces, the decisions
made and methods used in stocking and supplying task forces become critical.
We develop a methodology to properly stock a deploying task force with Class IX
repair parts. The problem facing a task force in preparation for a deployment is to
determine the repair parts, and their quantities, to support the end items given the space
constraints on board the ship. To solve the problem, we minimize the expected backorders
from the block of supplies taken by the deploying unit. We also propose a scheme to
assign mission priority factors to items and show how to use that scheme to ensure that the
deploying unit is taking the most important items. Our results suggest that backorders can
be reduced by as much as 13 percent using our model.
B. MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCES
1. Marine Air Ground Task Force
Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF, pronounced "Mag-taf") are "integrated
combined armed forces structured to accomplish specific missions" [Ref. 4:p. 9], such as
amphibious raids, show-offorce operations, and clandestine recovery operations. The forces
generally fall into one of three categories: Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), or Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF).
All MAGTFs are, by nature, expeditionary, and comprised of four elements: a Command
Element (CE), Ground Combat Element, Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and Combat
Service Support Element (CSSE).
The MEF is the primary Marine Corps warfighting force. "It is normally commanded by
a Lieutenant General and can range in size from less than one to multiple divisions and aircraft
wings, together with one or more force service support groups" [Ref. 4: p. 9]. A MEF is self-
sustaining for up to 60 days when deployed.
"The MEU is normally composed of a reinforced infantry battalion, a composite aviation
squadron (including attack helicopters, transport helicopters, air refuellers/transport aircraft,
light attack fixed wing aircraft, and command and control assets), a MEU service support
group, and a command element" [Ref 4: p. 9]. The MEU is commanded by a Colonel and is
equipped to deploy with 15 days of supplies. MAGTF Commanders use forward-deployed
MEUs that are Special Operations Capable (SOC), stationed onboard ships as part of an
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), to provide forward presence and limited power projection
overseas. AMEU conducts any of a number of missions, such as amphibious raids, security
operations, and show-of-force operations (see Appendix A for a complete list [Ref 5]).
We study the building of Class IX supply block for a MEU for two reasons: A MEU is
the size of force most often requiring that a supply block be built, as it is the principal
deploying force; and, we were able to obtain data from the recent deployment of 1 1th MEU
of I MEF from Camp Pendleton, California, with which we could evaluate the results of our
model. It is worth noting that although our study focuses only on a MEU, our results could
be applied to any size unit.
In missions for which a MEF or a MEU would be unsuitable or too large to implement,
a SPMAGTF is task-organized. The SPMAGTFs can be organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct a wide variety of expeditionary operations in response to a crisis or a peacetime
missions. Their duties can range from noncombatant evacuation to disaster relief and
humanitarian missions. [Ref. 4:p. 9]
2. The Role of a Combat Service Support Element
A CSSE is formed around a combat service support headquarters and may vary in size
and composition from a support detachment to one or more Force Service Support Groups
(FSSG). The CSSE is charged with providing the MAGTF with a full range of Combat
Service Support (CSS) functions (see Appendix B [Ref. 6: p. 1.6]). Of all CSS functions,
the supply function has the broadest scope. The existence of a supply system adequate to
sustain the MAGTF impacts the effectiveness of efforts in the other functional areas, as well
as in the force as a whole. Supply support greatly affects the MAGTF commander's ability
to integrate the essential elements of firepower, mobility, and sustainability on which the
MAGTF depends [Ref 6:p. 7.2].
Supplies are divided into nine classes (see Appendix C [Ref. 6:p. 7.2]):
Class I - Subsistence
Class II - Clothing and equipment
Class in - Petroleum, oils, and lubricants
Class IV - Construction materials
Class V - Ammunition
Class VI - Personal demand items
Class VII - Major end items
Class VIII - Medical Supplies
Class IX - Repair parts
We study the stocking of Class IX supplies because they most directly relate to the
MAGTF equipment availability. In addition, the majority of supplies that a MEU carries are
of Class IX. Class IX supplies include the repair parts needed to support a MAGTF'
s
warfighting equipment. Class IX supplies are repair parts that consist of consumables and
secondary repair parts (SecReps). Consumables, or non-repairable items, are discarded after
use, such as bolts, screws, etc. SecReps are repair parts such as alternator, and engines that
are used to repair an end item like a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
(HMMWV). Moreover, all SecReps can themselves be repaired.
Maintenance Float, the unit's maintenance department, performs intermediate
maintenance on its assigned equipment. Maintenance Float normally performs calibration,
repair, or replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or assemblies [Ref.
6:p. 8.1]. For example, if a HMMWV alternator breaks, it can be taken to Maintenance
Float and exchanged for an operational alternator. The mechanics at Maintenance Float will
then repair the broken alternator, if possible, and make it available for re-issue.
C. ISSUES LEADING TO THIS STUDY
During planned exercises and wartime operations, a CSSE is responsible for fulfilling
requisitions made by the MAGTF. The effectiveness ofthe CSSE depends, in part, on the
items it chooses to carry. Items requested by the MAGTF that the CSSE doesn't carry, or
doesn't have on-hand, must be ordered from a remote land-based supply point or a sea-based
asset. The CSSE is interested in determining how best to serve the MAGTF by stocking the
right items in the right quantities. [Ref. 7]
1. Constraint
The most binding constraint that affects the stocking strategy of a CSSE is the amount
of space allowed by the Commanding Officer of the ship to the MEU commander. Prior to
a deployment, a ship load-out plan is identified which provides the MEU with space onboard
the ship. The MEU then translates the given space into the number of containers.
The decline from four to three ships in an Amphibious Ready Group also has led to a
decline in the amount of space given to the CSSE. For example, when CSSE deploys, the
items that they take are divided amongst the ships in an ARG Each ship within an ARG
provides a MEU with a space. As the number of ships decreased, the total amount of space
given to the CSSE also decreased.
2. Problem Statement
The decision ofwhat to stock in a land-based CSSE is predicated by what was taken on
the deploying ships and aircraft [Ref. 7]. Thus, there are two problems, as illustrated in
Figure 1 : which items to take on deployment, and which of those items to take to the beach
for an operation. We call these Embarkation and Theater Sustainment problems,
respectively.
USA
Problem 1 Embarkation Problem 2. Theater Sustainment
Figure 1. Problem Description
a. Embarkation Problem
Units that are assigned to a MEU are task-organized and require assembling a
Battalion Landing Team (BLT), a Composite Squadron, and a MEU Service Support Group
(MSSG) from their respective organizations, such as wings, divisions, and Force Service
Support Groups, to form a MEU. A Command Element is set up within the MEU to provide
command, control, and coordination for planning and executing operations. Once the units
are task-organized, they are operationally controlled by the CE.
Approximately six months prior to a deployment, key personnel, such as
logisticians, from each of the MEU's units decide which end items (e.g., tanks, HMMWVs,
etc.) they should take on deployment to support the mission(s) determined by the MEU
Commander. Their recommendations are forwarded to their respective unit commanders.
Each unit commander, in turn, makes a recommendation to the MEU Commander. The MEU
Commander has the final say on what end items to take; this final list of end items goes into
an Equipment Density List (EDL).
The next task is to determine the quantity of repair parts needed to support the
end items. The Force Service Support Group (FSSG) collects historical peacetime usage data
on parts (both consumables and secondary repair parts) for each of these end-items, and
prorates that usage to determine the quantity of each part needed to support the deployment.
Once the deploying ships provide the MEU Commander with the amount of
allowed space, FSSG must decide which items, and in what number, to send in the allowable
space. Although processes differ slightly among MAGTFs, the MEU Supply Officer reviews
all the items for the units and prioritizes these into Combat Essentiality Code (CEC) 5 and 6,
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the mission critical items. He differentiates what goes and what stays behind by examining
the demand pattern of each repair part. If the item has had low or no demand over the last
six months or so, he highlights the item and discusses the item's demand pattern with the
requesting unit to see if it still wants the item. The final decision rests with the deploying unit.
Ifthere is still room available in the containers, the Supply Officer considers the non-mission
critical CEC 1-4 items. This process of prioritizing items continues until the allowed
containers are filled.
There are problems with this method. First, the stocking decision does not
account for the volume of each item, even though the final stocking decision is
volume-constrained [Ref. 7]. For example, the decision to take one additional HMMWV tire
instead of three additional HMMWV batteries must consider both the expected demand for
these items and the volume they consume in a container.
Second, the current method for stocking may not consider the relative importance
ofitems [Ref 7]. For example, while the Force Commander needs both HMMWV headlamps
and HMMWV batteries, he would probably prefer to run out of headlamps because he
considers HMMWV batteries more important. Using the current method, however, more
HMMWV headlamps might be stocked thanHMMWV batteries. (This difficulty is mitigated
in some MEFs, where a CEC is a key selection criterion.)
Third, this current process is very time-consuming. The 11th MEU's supply
section, which consists of20 personnel, devotes ten hours per day for six months to develop
the stock of supply [Ref. 8]. Assuming a normal five-day work week while ashore, that
equates to 24,000 man-hours. While there is no doubt that the supply section worked on
other tasks as well during this period, it is safe to say that developing the supply block for a
deploying MEU is extremely time-consuming and labor-intensive. The process of volume
trade-offamong those items with low demand history takes about a week, for a total of 200
hours [Ref. 8].
b. Theater Sustainment Problem
Once on station in a contingency operation, the deployed ship off-loads its
supplies, which are transported ashore to a Combat Service Support Area (CSSA), as shown
in Figure 2. The CSSA distributes supplies to the Combat Service Support Detachments
(CSSDs). A sea- or land-based resupply asset replenishes the CSSA. Each CSSD carries
a cache of supplies for each fighting unit. Ifan item is out of stock at the CSSA, then it must
be sent from the sea- or land-based resupply asset.
Figure 2. Combat Service Support Element Distribution System [Ref. 9]
10
Clearly, meeting supply needs from the closest entity in the supply chain lessens
the possibility that the fighting unit will be without needed supplies or repair parts. A longer
response time from a supply source further along in the supply chain can place the unit at risk.
Other factors that may lengthen response time are transportation asset limitations and
congested or closed supply routes.
All of the issues discussed in the Embarkation Problem above are also relevant
when deciding how to stock a detachment deploying to the beach, except that the volume,
although more important in this case, is not the only constraint to consider. As discussed
above, the stocking strategy ofa CSSE must consider the availability of transportation assets,
such as trucks, helicopters, and container handling equipment. Other constraints that must
be considered include weather, terrain, sea-state, CSSA availability, enemy threat, distance
of resupply, sea-based logistics capability, CSSE mobility, and the unit's stockage levels.
3. Issue to Address
The two problems presented here are closely linked. The Embarkation problem is an
input to the Theater Sustainment problem and must be addressed first. We address only the
Embarkation Problem — determining which items the CSSE should take, and in what
quantities, to best serve the MAGTF, while not exceeding the capacity constraint.
Not only is the Embarkation problem difficult and time consuming; it must also be solved
frequently. At the 1st FSSG in Camp Pendleton, this calculation is done approximately
twenty times per year [Ref. 10]. An analytical model to develop supply blocks could yield
significant savings in labor cost and effort.
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Determining which end items to include in the EDL is a command problem and is
addressed by the MEU Commander. When preparing for a deployment, a MEU must
consider its 1 8 possible missions and plan accordingly. Although some missions are stated
prior to a deployment, unplanned contingencies can occur. A unit not only has to plan for the
missions stated by the Force Commander, but also must anticipate potential crises that may
arise during deployment.
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n. REQUIREMENT GENERATION AND SUPPLY SUPPORT
A. CURRENT OPERATION
1. Preparation for a Deployment
Prior to a deployment, a MEU Commander solicits inputs from his units on which end
items to take in order to perform their assigned missions. After approving the final list of end
items, the MEU Commander submits an Equipment Density List (EDL) to the Supported
Activities Supply System Management Unit (SMU), the intermediate inventory source of
supply which provides supply support for all I MEF units. The EDL lists Principal End Items
(PEI), such as tanks, trucks, HMMWVs, and rifles, which are likely to be used by a MAGTF
on deployment.
The SMU Operations Section uses the EDL to generate a Deployment Support Generator
Package, commonly called "GenPak." Recently, the supply and maintenance battalions
determined a way to incorporate the Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management
System (MIMMS) data, which take into account usage of repair parts, into the GenPak
calculation. This is a significant improvement over the former method of determining usage
data input to the GenPak, which considered only consumables.
The GenPak provides the deploying unit with a list of consumables and SecReps needed
to support the principal end items. The GenPak is reviewed by the deploying unit's CSSE
Supply Officer and Maintenance Personnel to determine if both the recommended principal
end items and the quantity suggested are essential, or even necessary, to achieve the MEU's
prescribed missions. Considerations of availability of transportation, space, and past
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experience affect the extent to which the Supply Officer follows the GenPak
recommendations. For example, past experience may have shown that a water purification
unit is needed in the deployment region if they anticipate a humanitarian relief operation, and
the GenPak may fail to list this item. In this case, the Supply Officer would add a request for
a water purification unit. In some cases, the GenPak might recommend an artillery recoil
mechanism which takes up about 90 ft3 of space. Due to space constraints and the historically
low demand for this item, the recoil mechanism would be deleted from the GenPak
recommendation.
After the GenPak has been reviewed and amended ("scrubbed") by the deploying unit, a
final copy is submitted to the SMU. The SMU directs General Account and Storage to issue
those items that are available in its warehouse; those that are not available are placed on order
and ultimately delivered to the deploying unit by the unit's support detachment remaining in
the Continental United States (CONUS) or by the Deployment Support Unit (DSU), which
is a subordinate section within the SMU which coordinates Class IX support to deployed I
MEF units.
Upon receipt of items from the SMU supply warehouse, the CSSE Supply Department
builds a supply block in support ofprincipal end items. Supply block consists of consumable
and SecRep Class IX supplies. Generally, supply block will consists ofCombat Essentiality
Code 3 (safety), 5 (combat essential), and 6 (mission essential) repair parts, and of specifically
required insurance items to support the EDL for a specific operation as requested by unit
commanders [Ref. 11: p. 5].
14
The CEC is used to identify both combat essential and non-combat essential end items and
is broken down into six codes, CEC 1 to 6 (see Appendix D for a complete description [Ref.
12]). Combat essential end items are assigned a CEC code of "1", and critical repair parts
are assigned a CEC code of"5" and "6." "The repair part may be a functional part of an end
item component or assembly whose failure would make the end item inoperable or incapable
of fulfilling its mission" [Ref. 12].
Supply block is placed in a central location within the deploying unit. Upon notification
by the ship's Commanding Officer ofthe allowed space for their containers, the CSSE Supply
Officer starts the process of selecting which repair parts go and which stay. This process
differs from unit to unit. Some CSSE Supply Officers will use the demand for the repair
parts, which is shown on the GenPak, as their primary criterion for ranking the items. Those
repair parts with high usage are given loading priority over those with low demand rates. As
the container gets filled to capacity, the CSSE Supply Officer starts to look for those repair
parts with relatively low or no demand over a certain period (usually six months or so). He
then keeps a log of this potential Remain Behind Equipment (RBE). He communicates his
intention to leave behind pieces of equipment or parts to his customers, the units (i.e., BLT,
ACE, CE, or MSSG) to which the equipment belongs. The CSSE Supply Officer explains
to the units the low usage of the equipment as the basis for his recommendation. The
potential owner of the equipment will either accept or reject the CSSE Supply Officer's
recommendation.
The process continues until all the containers are filled. It is important to note that a
MEU carries Class III (Package Oil and Lubricants), minimal Class IV (construction), and
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some Class II (clothing and equipment-mostly military clothing that the CSSE Supply Officer
intends to sell to the troops). However, the majority of the containers are filled with CEC 5
and 6 Class DC supplies. In some cases, where the containers are not filled, the CSSE Supply
Officer will consider CEC 1-4 Class IX supplies for loading.
For other MEUs, the CSSE Supply Officer compares the number of needed containers
with the number of allowed containers to determine the percentage of the items that can
actually be sent. For example, if the items recommended by the GenPak require 40
containers, and there is room for only 30 containers, he will leave behind 25 percent of each
recommended item. RBEs are delivered to the deployed unit the same way as items on order
[Ref. 13].
Although it does not happen often, containers that are packed and transported for loading
onboard the ship are sometimes left behind because container capacity onboard the ship has
been exceeded. This could happen if the allowable number of containers is miscalculated
[Ref. 8], or ifthe ship load out plan changes [Ref. 14] .
2. Operation at Sea
Once deployed, the CSSE Supply Department acts as a distribution center, similar to
commercial retail, by providing its customers with items it has in stock. If a failed item is a
SecRep, it is sent to the Maintenance Float for repair. The repaired item will then be sent to
the CSSE Supply Department, where it will be made available for re-issue. The carcass or
retrograde of a SecRep that cannot be repaired by the Maintenance Float will stay with the
unit until it returns to CONUS.
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The SMU is responsible for resupplying the deployed MEU. Requisitions that are not in
stock at the CSSE are sent via SALTS, ATLASS, INMARSAT, certified LAN/Server, e-
mail, or secure phone to the SMU. The deployed MEU sends backorders for supplies to the
SMU at least daily. If the requisitioned item received from the unit is in stock at the SMU
supply warehouse, the item is taken to the 1st FSSG Preservation Packaging and Packing
(PPP) where it is prepared for shipping. The PPP then forwards the item to the requesting
unit by the most expeditious method (UPS, FedEx, or Military Airlift Command) in
coordination with the Transportation Management Office (TMO), Camp Pendleton. The item
being shipped is tracked by a Transportation Control Number (TCN), which is given to the
deployed unit as the primary means oftracking the shipped item.
The TCN, which conceivably contains one or more items, is also used to track shipping
cost. It is difficult to determine the cost of shipping an individual item (currently done
manually) because the data is not collected in a computer database. Also, when a group of
items is shipped under one TCN, cost of shipping is tracked for a TCN and not for the
individual NSN listed on the TCN. Determining shipping cost for an individual item in the
future should be easier since the TMO is in the process ofautomating the data collection [Ref.
15].
The TMO ships the item to the unit's next port-of-call. Thus, it is important that the
deployed unit communicate changes in its future destination to the TMO. Such
communication allows the TMO to re-route and deliver the shipped item to the unit's next
destination. This becomes crucial in the delivery of large and bulky parts (e.g., tank engines),
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for which guaranteed delivery is difficult even with UPS or FedEx [Ref. 15]. Consequently,
bulky items are given priority in container load-out even though their demand is very low
[Ref. 14].
Requisitioned items that are not in stock at the SMU supply warehouse are backordered
from the item manager or the item manufacturer. The DSU is tasked with tracking these
items and shipping them once they arrive at Camp Pendleton.
As arranged with the SMU prior to deployment, deployed units have an option to choose
between an automatic or manual Re-order Point (ROP) for a specific item or all items the unit
carries. ROP is the quantity to which inventory is allowed to drop before a replacement order
is placed [Ref. 16:p. 421]. In almost all cases, ROP is set automatically [Ref. 14]. When set
at automatic, ROP is programmed using Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY) and
Asset Tracking for Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS) to perform an automatic buy
whenever the item falls below the predesignated ROP. Currently, ROP is set at 75 percent
ofRe-order (RO) quantity, which is the quantity recommended by GenPak after it has been
"scrubbed" by the receiving unit [Ref. 17]. Unless specifically requested by the deployed unit
otherwise, automatic ROP is canceled about a month before returning to the CONUS since
the deployed unit is normally in-transit on their way to the CONUS around this time.
B. DETERMINATION OF NEEDED SUPPLY
All NSNs recommended by the GenPak (see Appendices E and F) to support the principal
end items of the deploying unit are based on I MEF peacetime historical usage data. The
Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance Management System collects the principal end items
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usage history (in peacetime) for the previous 12 months. As mentioned earlier, the EDL (see
Appendix G for a sample) specifies the quantity of principal end items a unit is taking. The
following illustrates how the SMU uses GenPak to generate the recommended principal end






EDL Qty = quantity of end items requested by a MEU,
LUAF Qty = Loading Unit Allowance File = total on-hand end item quantity at
the I MEF,
Recommended Number ofPEI = Consumption Rate * I MEF 12-month historical
usage ofthe PEI.
For example, assume the 1 1th MEU wishes to take 10 HMMWVs on a deployment. The
I MEF has 100 HMMWVs in its inventory. Since the GenPak is based on I MEF historical
usage, the GenPak will reveal the total items needed to support all 100 HMMWVs for one
year, say in this example, 200 tires. Since the 1 1th MEU is taking only ten percent of the
total inventory, the 1 1th MEU is entitled to 20 tires.
C. MEASURING SUCCESS
Whenever the MEU returns after a deployment, one ofthe statistics it provides to the I
MEF Force Commander is fill rate, which is the fraction of demands met from initial stock.
Normally, the fill rate is multiplied by 100 and is given as a percentage. The deployed units
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calculate fill rate to measure supply block performance. Intuitively, the higher the fill rate,
the better the supply support the unit receives.
However, the reported fill rate values do not take into account what was loaded on the
initial load-out at Camp Pendleton since the fill rate is calculated only while the unit is
deployed [Ref. 18]. The fill rate values in this case are not the fraction ofdemands met from
the initial load-out but rather the fraction ofdemands met from resupply by the SMU at Camp
Pendleton. Essentially, the current fill rate values do not give credit to the SMU for building
a good supply block for a deploying MEU.
Fill rate is calculated for CEC 5 and 6, CEC 1-4 supplies, and Maintenance Float rate.
During its most recent deployment, the 1 1th MEU fill rates were approximately 56 percent
for CEC 5 and 6, 20 percent for CEC 1-4, and 87 percent for Maintenance Float [Ref. 8].
In comparison, the 13th MEU, which deployed for the Western Pacific in 1996, had fill rates
of65 percent for CEC 5 and 6, 70.8 percent for CEC 1-4, and 95.5 percent for Maintenance
Float [Ref. 19]. One possible explanation ofthe differences in fill rate between the 1 1th MEU
and the 13th MEU was the decline in the number of line items that the 1 1th MEU has taken
[Ref. 8]. Prior to 1 1th MEU's recent deployment, MEUs take on average 6,000 line items.
The 1 1th MEU for their recent deployment took about 3,500 line items [Ref. 18].
Since there is no written performance standard or target goal for fill rates [Ref. 20], a
unit's performance is normally assessed by comparing its fill rates to fill rates from past
deployments. The desired range for CEC 5 and 6 fill rate is above 50 percent and above 80
percent for Maintenance Float (no desired range was given for CEC 1-4) [Ref. 8].
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Another measure of supply support used by the MEU is the Maintenance Readiness Rate.
Maintenance Readiness Rate is generated by the MEU and submitted weekly to the
Commanding General of 1st FSSG, who in turn submits it to his chain-of command all the
way to the Commandant of the Marine Corps [Ref. 21]. The rate measures a unit's
equipment (i.e., end items) readiness, and is used to portray each unit's capability to perform
its assigned wartime mission [Ref 22]. The rate simply measures the percentage of end items
that are judged "operational." The unit also cites reasons for equipment being non-
operational, whether due to supply or maintenance. The average Material Readiness Rate for
1 lth MEU during its most recent deployment for the 982 reportable end items was 97 percent
[Ref. 21].
D. DATA ISSUES
The GenPak does not take into account the volume of individual repair parts nor the
volume of allowed containers: The GenPak calculates its recommendation by assuming
unlimited container space, which is not the case. In related work using cost-based models,
Lau [Ref. 23 :p. 31] suggested that as the total allowable volume (budget, in their work) goes
down, solutions become more sensitive to the volume of an item and less sensitive to its
demand. When the capacity constraint gets tighter, it might appear reasonable to reduce each
recommended quantity by the same amount or the same percentage. However, as shown
above, this intuitively reasonable approach can be very wrong. [Ref. 23 :p. 32]
Another difficulty with the data involves rounding the quantities of prorated repair parts.
When a GenPak is generated, it lists recommended NSNs and their quantities to support the
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Principal End Items. Since the recommended number is computed for the entire MEF,
essentially a MEF average, and computed by dividing the one-year usage by twelve, the
output is a fraction rather than an integer. Consequently, rounding must be done to determine
the recommended quantity ofthe item. The current protocol is to round down to the nearest
integer fractions less than 0.5 and round up to the nearest integer fractions greater than or
equal to 0.5. The rounding protocol does not differentiate between items of different
essentiality. For example, items having CEC 5 and 6 are prorated the same way as those in




The objective of Combat Service Support is to sustain and enhance
the relative power of the MAGTF at the tactical level of war. This
equates to the ability to maintain and sustain organizations and
equipment—the firepower and mobility assets—ofthe MAGTF. [Ref.
6:p. 1.4]
Although our methodology cannot influence the organizational aspect that affects the
firepower and mobility of a MAGTF, it can influence the way a MAGTF is outfitted with
equipment. The question is: Which items should the Combat Service Support Element take,
and in what quantities, to best serve the MAGTF, while not exceeding the capacity
constraint?
Currently, when a MAGTF deploys, the load-out decision does not take into account the
volume of each item, even though the final load-out decision is volume-constrained. In
addition, the method for load-out may not consider the relative importance of items.
Moreover, the process is very costly in terms of man-hours. Planning for a deployment with
multiple missions further complicates the issue of load-out.
Our methodology takes into account aspects ofthe problem that the current process does
not. In planning for a deployment load-out, we consider the volume of each item, its relative
importance, and its historical demand. We also introduce the notion of mission priority
factors to allow a MAGTF to customize its supply block to be mission-specific.
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B. OBJECTIVE
Our objective is to provide the CSSE Supply Officer with a decision aid for making load-
out decisions. The MAGTF's objective is to minimize backorders in order to maximize
equipment availability and, consequently, readiness. The idea of minimizing backorders is the
basis of our model. Before describing the model, we discuss fill rate and expected
backorders.
1. Fill Rate vs. Backorders
Fill rate is the percentage of demands that can be met at the time they are placed, while
backorders are the number of unfilled demands that exist at a point in time [Ref. 24 :p. 24].
In commercial retail, ifthe customer demand cannot be satisfied, a customer either goes away
or returns at a later time when the item has been re-stocked. The first case can be classified
as lost sales while the second case creates a backorder on the supplier or manufacturer. In
military applications, especially in most critical equipment, any demand that is not met is
backordered. The backorder is outstanding until a resupply for the item is received, or a failed
item is fixed and made available for issue.
These two principal measures of item performance—fill rate and backorders—are related,
but very different. Commercial retailers are more interested in the fill rate than in backorders
because fill rate measures customer satisfaction at the time each demand is placed. Not only
is fill rate easy to calculate, but it also helps retailers form a picture of how well they are
meeting customer demand. Experience may tell them that a 90 percent fill rate on an item is
not acceptable and will create customer complaints. On the other hand, backorders are not
as easy to compute as fill rate. In order to calculate backorders, retailers need to keep track
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of the number of customers who still have outstanding requisitions. Furthermore, the
backorder numerical value is less intuitive to a retailer than the fill rate.
Unlike commercial retail business, the military is not concerned with lost sales. The
military measures performance not in terms of sales, but in terms ofequipment availability.
2. Availability
"Availability measures the degree to which a system is in an operable and committable
state at the start of a mission when the mission is called for at an unknown, random point in
time; it is often called operational readiness" [Ref. 25 :p. 22].
We use the concept of Operational Availability Ao, which can be expressed as:
^ ,• j a / l-iv. 100*MTBMOperationalAvailabihty- - n n
where MTBM is the mean time between maintenance and MDT is mean down time. If the
system is not down for either maintenance or supply, the system is said to be operational.






whereMCMT is mean corrective maintenance time, MPMT is mean preventive maintenance
time, and MSD is the mean supply delay time. The MDT in Equation 3.1 is equal to the
following:
MDT=MCMT+MPMT+MSD. (3.4)
The maintenance availability can computed given the maintenance manning, test
equipment, and preventive maintenance policy. It can be seen from Equation 3.2 that the
maintenance availability depends on the mean time between maintenance, but is independent
ofthe stockage policy, MSD. However, as shown on Equation 3.3, the supply availability
is independent ofthe maintenance policy, and is a function ofthe stockage policy. [Ref. 24: p.
38]
Sherbrooke [Ref. 24: pp. 19-40] shows that minimizing the sum of expected backorders
is equivalent to maximizing Operational Availability Ao, under the following conditions:
1
.
for a stock level s, a reorder or repair of one unit is initiated whenever the level falls
to 5-1,
2. the failure of a single item makes the end item unavailable, and
3. there are no cannibalizations.
The first assumption is approximately met by our system since backorders are relayed to the
SMU daily or twice daily from the deploying unit. The second assumption is not realistic for
our system (a HMMWV does not become inoperable with a blown headlight, for example),
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but is necessary in the absence of reliability block diagrams for all end items. The final
assumption is reasonable in peacetime scenarios, but breaks down for contingency operations.
C. THE MODEL
1. Introduction
We develop a model to determine the optimal level of Class IX supplies for a deploying
MAGTF. The optimization considers the marginal decrease in expected backorders for an
additional increase in repair parts. The calculation of expected backorders takes into account
an item's demand, its volume, and the allowed container space.
The model was written using a dialect of the Lisp programming language called Scheme




1 : For all items i, calculate 6
t
(s)
2: While volume consumed < V
3
:
Let itemy be that item with the largest S
i
(s)
4: Add one unit ofitemy to the block
5: Increment volume consumed by v
y









EBOj (s) = Expected backorders for item / at stock level s,
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V— Total volume of the supply block,
v = Volume of an item.
Expected backorders are
EBO=Pr{DI=s+\} +2*Pr{DI=s+2) +3 *Pr{DI=s+3} +...
= £ <x-s)*Pr{DI=x},
x=s+\
where the Pr{) terms are the steady-state probabilities for the number of units of stock due-
in, 5 is the stock level, and DI is the number of units of stock due-in from repair or re-supply
[Ref. 24 :p. 25]. Step 3 of the algorithm computes the marginal decrease in expected
backorders per volume, for each item. This corresponds to the increase in system
effectiveness per volume when an additional unit of that item is chosen for stockage [Ref.
24:p. 30]. The algorithm compares the d
i
(s) values for all items and adds one unit ofthe item
having the largest S
t
(s). The process continues until the total volume is filled.
3. Input to the Model
The model requires several inputs from the user:
1. Total available volume. This is obtained from the space given by the
Commanding Officer ofthe ship to the MAGTF Commander. The amount of allowed space
is translated into cubic feet.
2. For each item, the demand and cube. The demand is obtained from the
GenPak. The volume of each item came from the Defense Logistic Services Center database,
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Marine Logistics Base, Albany freight file data, and Cubiscan measurement as measured by
the SMU.
3. The planning horizon. The planning horizon is the number of days a unit is
expected to be supported. For example, planning guidelines require a MEU to deploy with
15 days of supplies (DOS). Currently, a deploying MEU is outfitted with 30 DOS since the
recommended GenPak quantities are based on peacetime historical data [Ref. 10].
4. Mission priority factors. Mission priority factors are intended to customize the
supply block according to the MAGTF missions. For example, a MEU has 18 possible
missions; we propose that a priority matrix be created ofthe form shown in Figure 3 to assign
a mission priority for each end item for a particular mission as follows: A=critical, B=very
important, C=important, and D=desirable.
Next, we assign a factor such as A=1.0, B=0.5, C=0.7, and D=0.4 to differentiate priority
of end items having the same Combat Essentiality Code. We do this because a MEU typically
has space enough for only CEC 5 and 6 items.
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MEU Missions
End Item I 2 3 4 5 * * * 18
PNSN1 A A A B B A




B A A C D C
*
PNSN 532 A A B C C D
Figure 3. Mission Priority Matrix
4. Modeling Demand
We were unable to obtain data from which to determine the demand distribution for each
item. Because the demand for most items is very low (less than one per month) and failures
of repairables are generally unpredictable, we assume that demands for all items occur
according to the Poisson distribution. This seems reasonable in light ofthe fact that only 158
of 19,100 total items have monthly demand greater than one for the entire MEU.
5. Weakness of the Model
The model is greedy in nature, adding at each step a unit of the item that yields the
greatest increase in system effectiveness per volume. Consequently, it favors smaller items,
all other things being equal. The CSSE Supply Officer occasionally makes decisions that are
directly at odds with this tendency ofthe model, by choosing a bulky item specifically because
it is bulky and difficult to ship. These anomalies can be addressed by using minimum
quantities as input to the model.
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D. DATA
We collected data for our study from several sources. The complete data file is available
at the Naval Postgraduate School Systems Management Department.
We obtained repair parts usage data from (the 1st FSSG at Camp Pendleton).
Approximately six months prior to their deployment, the 1 1th MEU submitted an EDL to the
SMU containing 532 end items. When the GenPak was calculated, it listed 36,290 repair
parts and their corresponding historical usage in support ofthe 532 end items (PNSNs). Some
of the 32,290 repair parts (RNSNs) supported multiple items. For example, the same bolt
maybe used to repair a tank and a HMMWV. After consolidating duplicate repair parts and
their monthly demand, the number of unique RNSNs dropped to 19,100.
The GenPak does not keep track ofthe volume of items. The Defense Logistics Center
(DLSC) in Battlecreek, MI provided us with 9,167 RNSNs with volume measurements. The
Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany, Georgia provided freight file data containing 17,184
RNSNs with volume measurement. Of these, only 4,613 RNSNs applied to what the 1 1th
MEU took. The SMU purchased a machine called a Cubiscan that measures the weight and
cubic size ofan item. The SMU supply warehouse had about 500 remaining RNSNs on hand
for measurement. Out of the 500 RNSNs, 410 applied to the 1 1th MEU data. This raised
our volume measurements to 14, 190 out of 19, 100 RNSNs.
For the missing volume measurements, we assumed the volume of 0.01 ft3 . This volume
represents the median value ofthe volume ofthe 14, 190 NSNs with known volume. We used
the median instead ofthe mean, 2.3966 ft3
,
because the median is more representative ofthe
remaining NSNs. We justified our assumption as follows:
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a. From our observation ofthe data, we observed that the NSNs missing volume
data are made up of small items. The first quartile value is 0.072 ft3 . The third quartile value
is 0.001 ft3 .
b. Out of the 14,190 NSNs, only 1,010 NSNs have volume greater than 1.0 ft3 .
c. Unlike the mean, the median is not influenced at all by the extreme observations
in the data set. There were two NSNs with a combined volume of 5,141.8 ft3 . These two
items greatly affected the mean.
d. In general, one could expect that more volume measurements would exist for
larger items than smaller items.
The mission priorities for the 532 end items were provided by the G-3 Plans officer at 1st
FSSG. He assumed the following in assigning the mission priority:
1
.
All the end items are necessary for the MAGTF to complete its mission and was
already "scrubbed" due to space constraints [Ref. 27].
2. The load-out plan is for the parts and supplies needed to support the end items [Ref.
25].
Mission priorities were assigned with a generic mission in mind. The decision was based
solely on his experience and with the help of Marine Corps Bulletin 3000 (MCBul 3000).
MCBul 3000 contains reporting instruction procedures and lists the tables of equipment to
be reported in the Maintenance Readiness Rate [Ref. 22]. The breakdown of the mission
priority for the 532 end items are as follows: 96 items are classified as A; 50 are classified as
B; 11 are classified as C; and 35 are classified as D. For the 19,100 NSNs, the mission
priority assignment are: 14,927 NSNs are classified as A; 955 NSNs are classified as B; 212
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NSNs are classified as C; and 3,006 are classified as D. We assigned the mission priority to
an item by choosing the highest priority for all end-items which that item supports.
For the volume constraint, we computed the total volume ofthe Class IX that the 1 1th
MEU took. MEU-1 1 took 3,328 RNSNs, which consist of Class II, in, IV, and IX. Out of
the 3,328 RNSNs, 2, 140 of that are Class IX supplies. Knowing the volume of these 2,140
RNSNs and their corresponding quantities, we calculated the total volume to be 14,754 ft3 .
We used this volume in our model so that we could accurately compare the outcome of our





Given the quantities ofClass EX supplies and their associated volume taken by 1 1th MEU,
we computed the total volume. We used this same volume as the total volume constraint for
our model. We also used data on the demanded items and their associated quantities during
the entire deployment. The total number of demanded items during the 11th MEU's
deployment was 1,614, and only 1,097 ofthem were Class IX.
We performed six runs of the model on the data from the 1 1th MEU, as shown in Table
4.1. Each run corresponded to a different combination of mission priority factors and
planning horizon. Our intent was to determine the sensitivity ofthe model to changes in these
parameters. From this analysis, we aim to determine a good initial value for the mission
priority factors and planning horizon. Better values will evolve from experience.
We used the 1,097 NSNs as the basis of our comparison. We compared this value with
what the 1 1th MEU carried as part of its initial supply load-out and what our model
recommended. The result of this comparison is shown in Figure 4. The demand column
represents the total number ofitems demanded during the entire deployment. The 1 1th MEU
column depicts what the 1 1th MEU took as part oftheir initial load-out. The Runs 1 through
6 show what our model recommends. The model recommended quantities are in terms of
unit-of-issue. Representative graphs of the changes in mission priority factors are illustrated
in Figure 5.
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NSN MON RATE DEMAND 11th MEU RUN1 RUN2 RUN3 RUN4 RUN5 RUN6
5310004883888 44.35448 22 60 51 82 51 82 82 83
2530012044421 25.1953 740 31 49 31 49 49 49
2920011883863 19.98116 18 160 28 43 28 43 43 43
1005000506357 1403624j 3 23 34 23 34 34 34
1005004946602 11.02091 2 20 30 21 30 30 30
5305000826821 10.21128 70 308 19 28 19 28 28 28
1005012044376 10.1784 30 18 20 29 20 29 29 29
1005010838113 9.5633 20 17 25 17 25 25 25
1005009991435 8.52321 106 16 24 16 24 24 24
1005009031296 7.80294 100 17 24 17 24 24 24
1005009372250 5.0365 75 190 14 19 14 19 19 19
5965000433463 4.68209 46 33 13 17 13 17 17 17
1005011130321 4.15154 2 50 13 17 13 18 17 18
5330011343786 4.14658 28 40 13 17 13 17 17 17
5995013100335 4.05896 5 20 13 18 13 18 18 18
5305011582041 3.88847 7 12 11 15 11 15 15 15
6135010363495 3.27804 328 1788 10 14 10 14 14 14
5330007409550 2.99656 4 60 10 13 10 13 13 13
1005011343629 2.86766 49 49 10 13 10 13 13 13
5305011583164 2.68693 73 25 10 13 10 14 13 14
6240000190877 2.67447 2 24 11 15 11 15 15 15
5310011231421 2.67284 12 88 11 15 11 15 15 15
5985013401043 2.65468 67 14 11 15 11 15 15 15
5340013464291 2.44882 63 10 10 13 10 13 13 13
2920011757214 2.18802 1 100 9 12 9 12 12 12
Figure 4. Model Recommended Quantities for the 25 Highest Demand Items
Run
Mission Priority Factor
A B C D Planning Horizon
1 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5
1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5
1.0 0.5 0.2 0.1
1.0 0.5 0.2 0.1
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0















Figure 5. Graphs of Mission Priority Factors
B. RESULTS
The top 25 recommended quantities, sorted according to the item's demand from
highest to lowest, is shown in Figure 4. From the results, we calculated the difference
between the actual Class IX demand during the 1 1th MEU's deployment and what the unit
took as part of its initial Class IX supply load-out. We performed the same calculation
between the actual demand and what the model recommended.
We computed the number of backordered items as follows: Given what was demanded
and what was supplied, if the number supplied is greater than or equal to the number
demanded, then the number ofitems backordered is zero; otherwise, the backordered quantity
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is the difference between what was supplied and what was demanded. The result of this
comparison is shown in Figure 6.
NSN M0N RATE 11th MEU-1 RUN1-1 RUN2-1 RUN3-1 RUN4-1 RUN5-1 RUN6-1
5310004883888 44.35448




5305000826821 10.21128 51 42 51 42 42 42
1005012044376 10.1784 12 10 1 10 1 1 1
1005010838113 9.5683 20 3 3
1005009991435 8.52321 106 90 82 90 82 82 82
1005009031296 7.80294 100 83 76 83 76 76 76
1005009372250 5.0365 61 56 61 56 56 56
5965000433463 4.68209 13 33 29 33 29 29 29
1005011130321 4.15154
5330011343786 4.14658 15 11 15 11 11 11
5995013100335 4.05896
5305011532041 3.88847
6135010363495 3.27804 318 314 318 314 314 314
5330007409550 2.99656
1005011343629 2.86766 39 36 39 36 36 36
5305011583164 2.68693 48 63 60 63 59 60 59
6240000190877 2.67447
5310011231421 2.67284 1 1
5985013401043 2.65468 53 56 52 56 52 52 52
5340013464291 2.44882 53 53 50 53 50 50 50
2920011757214 2.18802 o o
Figure 6. Backorder Comparison
We grouped the number of backordered items according to their mission priority (see
Table 4.2). The demand column shows the number of demands during the six-month
deployment in each mission priority category. The 1 1th MEU column shows the sum of the
unit's backordered items. The Runs 1 through 8 columns show the total number of
backorders the 1 1th MEU would have had if they had taken what our model recommends.
The parameters used for the runs are shown in Table 4.1.
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Category Demand llthMEU Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run 5 Run 6
A 6,417 4,134 3,977 3,700 3,963 3,688 3,700 3,674
B 292 224 202 196 203 197 196 210
C 86 85 76 75 76 75 75 77
D 281 261 112 107 128 119 106 125
Total 7,076 4,704 4,367 4,078 4,370 4,079 4,077 4,086
Table 4.2 Total Backorder Comparison
The results suggest that the model would have provided a better mix of supplies than that
actually taken by the 1 1th MEU. The supply block recommended by the model would have
led to fewer backorders in every mission priority category, for all combinations of parameters.
For example, in Run 1, the model has 3.8 percent fewer backorders than that of the 11th
MEU for category A; 9.8 percent fewer for category B; 10.6 percent fewer for category C;
and 57.1 percent fewer for category D. For the same mission priority factors, but with 30
days instead of 15 days planning horizon, Run 2 showed a reduction of 10.5 percent in
backorders for category A; 12.5 percent for category B; 11.8 percent for category C; and
59.0 for category D. The comparison for the other runs is shown in Table 4.3.
Category llthMEU Run 1 %DifT Run 2 %Diff Run 6 % Diff
A 4,134 3,977 3.80 3,700 10.50 3,674 11.13
B 224 202 9.82 196 12.50 210 6.25
C 85 76 10.59 75 11.76 77 9.41
D 261 112 57.09 107 59.00 125 52.11
Table 4.3 Percent Difference in Total Backorders
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As expected, Run 6 provided us with the best supply for category A by having the least
number of backorders because we set a much higher mission priority factor for category A
than for the others. As a result, the model made room to stock more category A items, while
carrying fewer ofthe items in categories B through D.
The mission priority factors had little effect on the results of our model. As we varied the
mission priority, as in runs 1, 3, 5, and 6, the output did not change considerably. We believe
this is because the large majority ofNSNs (78 %) were classified category A. However, we
saw a change in the output as we went from 1 5 to 30 days planning horizon. Supply blocks
built with a 30-day planning horizon performed significantly better.
The potential to further decrease the number of backorders exists with input from the
user. Users consider, among other things, their intended mission or missions and past
experiences in determining the kind and quantity of supplies that they should take. This is
evident from what the unit took during its last deployment, compared to the GenPak
recommendation. For example, the 11th MEU took 1,788 non-rechargeable batteries to
support 13 of its radio sets. Apparently the user had a significant input on the quantity taken,
considering that the historical monthly demand for the battery is 3. The total demands for
non-rechargeable batteries for the entire deployment was 328.
Another apparent input from the user was on the electrical coil. The unit took 100 of
these to support 5 1 of its radio set controllers. That quantity is almost fifty times the
historical monthly demand of 2. 18802 per controller per month. The actual total demand for
this item was one.
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The user's input paid off in some cases, as in the battery example above; however, there
are instances where apparent unit input led to backorders. For instance, the unit decided not
to stock track shoe pads, an item that supports one Assault Amphibious Vehicle. The
decision not to stock this part, even though there was a 25. 1 953 historical monthly usage for
it per vehicle, did not help the unit. The unit demanded 740 track shoe pads during its
deployment.
To facilitate user interaction, the model allows the user to specify minimum or maximum
quantities. For minimum quantities, the user specifies these for each NSN and subtracts the
appropriate volume from total available volume. The model runs as before, except the
marginal decrease in expected backorders for these items is calculated from the minimum
quantities instead of zero.
The user may also assign maximum quantities for items. If a maximum is reached, that
item is assigned its maximum quantity and removed from the pool of candidate items as the
algorithm continues to build the block. Maximum quantities may be appropriate for very
expensive or scarce items.
C. REDUCED SUPPLY SHIPPING COSTS
In addition to reducing readiness, backorders also carry a financial penalty in the form of
shipping costs. Because each backorder from a deployed unit is filled from Camp Pendleton,
and often uses premium transportation, the shipping costs ofbackorders have historically been
in the hundreds of thousands of dollars [Ref. 15]. For the 1 1th MEU, shipping costs were
$229,887 for all classes of supplies [Ref 28].
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Using the best run of our model, which had a total 13.3 percent fewer backorders, we
estimate that the 11th MEU would have saved $11,007 in shipping costs with the
recommended supply block. (We assumed that 36 percent of the shipped items are Class IX.
This percentage corresponds to the Class EX supplies that the 1 1th MEU took as part of its
initial load-out at Camp Pendleton.)
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Increasing mobility by reducing logistics footprint is an important part of the Operational
Maneuver from the Sea concept. Since increased mobility necessitates a smaller cache of
supplies for deployed armed forces, the Marine Air Ground Task Forces in particular, the
decisions made and methods used in stocking and supplying task forces become critical. In
Chapter I we gave an overview of the task forces organization, presented the research
problem, and stated the objective of the thesis. We started our discussion by defining a
MAGTF, and then moved to a unit within a MAGTF, the MEU, to point out the role of a
Combat Service Support Element in providing supply support to the MAGTF. In particular,
we focused our attention on Class EX supplies.
In Chapter II we discussed the current operation of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, both
prior to deployment and at sea. We also explained how, with the help of the "GenPak," a
deploying unit determines what Class IX supplies to take and how the current supply support
is being evaluated. We noted a number of problems with the current method of building a
supply block.
In Chapter III we presented our model and introduced the notion that backorders are
superior to fill rate as a measure of supply support. We established backorders as the basis
ofour model. We used this idea as a way to maximize availability and, consequently, enhance
readiness. The chapter concluded with the discussion of the data.
43
In Chapter IV we examined the results of the model. We conducted sensitivity analysis
on the model, and compared the results with the 1 1th MEU's initial stock of supplies. Lastly,
the chapter pointed out the costs of supply backorders.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The FSSG responded favorably to the outcome of the model [Ref. 29]. Our results
suggested that the model could be used to reduce backorders by more than 10 percent in all
mission priority categories with no interaction by the user.
User interaction could further reduce the total number of expected backorders. We
contend that the model would not only increase the readiness of deploying MAGTFs, but also
significantly reduce the costs of supporting them. We estimated that an FSSG could
potentially save tens of thousands of dollars annually by using the model.
There is a significant improvement in the supply block when using a 30-day planning





We recommend that our model be adopted to build Class IX supply blocks for
deploying MAGTFs. For the input to the model, we recommend that the user select 30 days
for the planning horizon.
2. As we mentioned earlier, our model can be customized to recommend supplies for a
specific mission or multiple missions. We recommend that a matrix similar to Figure 3 be
developed. The matrix could be simplified by grouping similar missions into the same
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category. In addition, the matrix could be extended to take into account interdependency of
items. For example, a gas generator will not function without a spark plug.
3. We recommend that the Marine Corps record demand data for deploying MAGTFs.
The data should be collected on specific units, but should be set up to be easily aggregated
into groups of MEUs or even a MEF. The data should be keyed to the type of mission
fulfilled by the unit so that future supply blocks could be mission-specific.
4. In terms of supply support measurement, we recommend tracking backorders.
Although fill rate tends to have clearer meaning to commercial suppliers, the rate does not
have the same meaning in military applications. Using the concept of backorders, a unit can
determine the status of its supply support not just when the order was placed, but up to the
time the item is received.
5. Finally, we recommend that further study be conducted to develop stockage strategies
for multi-echelon battlefield distribution problems. The research should consider readiness,
the availability oftransportation assets, the security of lines of communication, and the need
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APPENDIX A




* Limited Objective Attack
* Mobile Training Teams




* Tactical Recovery of Aircraft,
Equipment, and Personnel
* Fire Support Control
* Counterintelligence Operations
* Initial Terminal Guidance
* Electronic Warfare
* Military Operations in Urban Terrain
* Clandestine Recovery Operations
* Specialized Demolition Operations






SUBFUNCTIONS OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Maintenance
DETERMINATION OF REQUIREMENTS INSPECTION AND CLASSIFICATION
PROCUREMENT SERVICING, ADJUSTMENT, AND TUNING
STORAGE (TO INCLUDE CARE IN STORAGE) TESTING AND CALIBRATION
DISTRIBUTION REPAIRAND MODIFICATION
SALVAGE REBUILD AND OVERHAUL


































Class I - Subsistence including gratuitous health and welfare items. Subclassifications for
class I are: A-air (in-flight rations), R- refrigerated subsistence, S-nonrefrigerated subsistence
(less combat rations), and C-combat rations (including gratuitous health and welfare items).
Class II - Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and tool kits,
hand tools, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment. Subclassifications for
class II are: B-ground support material, E-general supplies, F-clothing and textiles, M-
weapons, and T-industrial supplies (including bearings, block and tackle, cable, chain, wire
rope, screws, bolts, studs, steel rods, plates, and bars).
Class III - Petroleum, oils, and lubricants; petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and
insulating oils, preservatives, liquid and compressed gases, bulk chemical products, coolants,
deicing and antifreeze compounds, together with components and additives of such products;
and coal. Subclassifications for class III are: A-air and W-ground (surface).
Class IV - Construction: construction materials to include installed equipment and all
fortification/barrier materials. No subclassifications.
Class V - Ammunition: ammunition of all types (including chemical, biological,
radiological, and special weapons), bombs, explosives, mines, fuzes, detonators, pyrotechnics,
missiles, rockets, propellants, and other associated items. Subclassifications for class V are:
A-air and W-ground.
Class VI - Personal demand Items (nonmilitary sales items). No subclassifications.
53
Class Vll - Major end items: a final combination of end products which is ready for its
intended use; e.g., launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles. Subclassifications
for class Vll are: A-air, B-ground support material (includes power generators and
construction, barrier, bridging, fire fighting, petroleum, and mapping equipment),
D-administrative vehicles (commercial vehicles used in administrative motor pools), G-
electronics, K-tactical vehicles, L-missiles, M-weapons, and N-special weapons.
Class VIII - Medical material including medical unique repair parts. Subclassifications
are: A-medical/dental material, less blood and blood products, B-blood and blood products.
Class IX - Repair parts and components to include kits, assemblies and subassemblies,
reparable and nonreparable, required for maintenance support of all equipment.
Subclassifications for class IX are the same as class VII with the addition of T-industrial
supplies (includes bearings, block and tackle, cable, chain, wire rope, screws, bolts, studs,





1 Combat Essential End Item . End items of equipment whose availability in a
combat ready condition is essential for execution of the combat and training
mission of the command.
2 Non-Critical Repair Part . Repair parts whose failure in the end item will not
render it inoperative or reduce its effectiveness below the minimum acceptable
level of efficiency, and which do not fit the definition of code 3 or 4 items.
3 Critical Item/Repair Part for Health and Safety ofPersonnel . Those items that are
required for the health and safety of personnel, and which do not fit the definition
of code 5 or 6 items.
4 Critical Item/Repair Part for State and Local Laws . Those items that are required
to conform with state and local laws, and which do not fit the definition of code
5 or 6 items.
5 Critical Repair Part to a Combat Essential End Item . Repair parts whose failure
in a combat essential end item will render it inoperative or reduce its effectiveness
below the minimum acceptable level of efficiency.
6 Critical Repair Part to a Non-Combat Essential End Item . Repair parts whose
failure in a non-combat essential end item will render it inoperative or reduce its




GENPAK - SECONDARY REPAm PARTS
GENPACK SDR RO INCREASES (SAC-1 ONLY)
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GENPAK - CONSUMABLE PARTS





00152AREEL EQUIPM 5805004077722 50 746 6.7
00266B ANTENNA ELE 5985010631574 25 1,039 2.4
00414ATOOL KIT.CA 5180005405741 1 49 2.0
004 82A DEMOLITION 1375002124589 1 80 1.3
00609ATOOL KIT, EX S180007S40644 1 15 6.7
TOOL KIT, EX 5180007540644 1 IS 6.7
R C
V E
PNSN NOMEN £ CUI









5985-00-930-7223 ANTENNA SUBAS Z 5 EA 30.3 0.7 $0.39
00266B ID# SUBTOTAL:
6145-00-643-3482 CABLE, POWER, E F 5 FT 33.4 0.7 $0.29
00414A ID* SUBTOTAL:
6145-00-548-1296 CABLE. POWER, E Z 5 FT 41.7 0.5
1375-00-225-2419 CONNECTOR , DET Z S EA
6135-01-351-1131 BATTERY, NONRE Z S EA
$0.06





006 09A IDS SUBTOTAL:
00826A TELEPHONE S 5805005211320 48 984 4 . 9 5895-00-543 -1881 CASE , TELEPHON Z 5 EA
00983A PANEL MARJCE 8345003750227 4 46 8.7






ie . 3 1 0T9] $12.04
00826A IDS SUBTOTAL:
8345-00-227-1700 PIN, PANEL MAR Z 6 EA 15.2 1.3 $0.05
00983A IDS SUBTOTAL:
8340-00-261-9750 PIN, TENT Z 5 EA 61.7 1.9 $0.65
01360A IDS SUBTOTAL:
9 47 19.11375-00-212-4602 CLIP, CORD DET Z 5 EA
47 19.11375-00-225-2419 CONNECTOR , DET Z 5 EA
9 47 19.1J137S-01-033-8317 ADAPTER, PRIMI Z 5 EA
9 47 19.1J6145-00-2S4-0394 WIRE, ELECTRIC Z 5 FT










































IT_DE_NU EDL QTY RNSNGMA1 RNSN NUN PNSN NOMEN TAMCN
00035A 39 7510002644492 002644492 7510002644492 OFFICE SUPPLY S C53202
00038G 1 6115001181243 001181243 6115001181243 GENERATOR SET.D B10217
00141A 26 5895003563902 003563902 5895003563902 CASE.ELECTRONIC H72282
001 49A 4 5950002358730 002358730 5950002358730 COILTELEPHONE H21902
001 52A 50 5805004077722 004077722 5805004077722 REEL EQUIPMENT H23802
001 88A 4 6150004989130 004989130 6150004989130 CABLE ASSEMBLY, H20752
001 92B 11 4240002739668 002739668 4240002739668 CLIMBER'S SETJ J30402
00266A 5 5985004978554 004978554 5985004978554 ANTENNA H20452
00266B 25 5985010631574 010631574 5985010631574 ANTENNA ELEVATO A00597
00272A 5 3895002526896 002526896 3895002526896 REELING MACHINE H23852
00276B 6 5805007156171 007156171 5805007156171 SWITCHBOARD.TEL A24807
0031 8B 2 6625005531565 005531565 6625005531565 TEST SET,BATTER H70222
00349A 4 8345003750226 003750226 8345003750226 PANEL MARKER SE K46702
00352A 13 5975001875296 001875296 5975002403860 ROD.GROUND H72132
00357B 12 5965009006401 009006401 5965009006401 HEADSET-CHEST S H22652
00368A 9 6230004989408 004989408 6230004989408 LANTERN,ELECTRI K45072
00371A 2 9905005378956 005378956 9905005378956 TAG.MARKER
00374A 28 5975003141042 003141042 5975003141042 HOOK.RETAINING H22852
00376B 4 3895003563937 003563937 3895003563937 AXLE AND CRANK H20552
00380A 14 5180004081859 004081859 5180004081859 TOOL KIT.ELECTR H79142
00390A 7 5210002672829 002672829 5210002672829 GAGE.CLIMBER'S H22402
00394A 64 8345005673323 005673323 8345005673323 PANEL MARKER K46552
00395A 60 8345005907117 005907117 8345005907117 PANEL MARKER K46602
00396A 42 8345001746865 001746865 8345001746865 PANEL MARKER K46652
00401
B
25 4610002689890 002689890 4610002689890 BAG,WATER STERI C41102
00403A 16 8340002625767 002625767 8340002625767 REPAIR KIT.TENT C58702
00411
A
9 7310002856155 002856155 7310014127813 STOVE.GASOLINE K49402
0041 3A 1 7530002706169 002706169 7530002706169 STATIONERY SET/ C62602
0041 4 1 5180005405741 005405741 5180005405741 TOOL KIT.CARPEN B22202
00420B 1 7520010234498 010234498 7520010234498 FINGERPRINT IDE K43422
00422C 8 7360001874757 001874757 7360001874757 ACCESSORY OUTFI C40002
00424B 26 1025009334884 009334884 1025009334884 CHEST.UTILITY C43402
00432A 1 5180005405740 005405740 5180005405740 TOOL KIT.CANVAS C65002
00438B 8 4540004696593 004696593 4540004696593 HEATER.IMMERSIO j C49802
00440A 15 4540002666834 002666834 4540002666834 HEATER.IMMERSIO V45302
00441 63 5110008131286 008131286 5110008131286 MACHETE,RIGID H K45202
00447A 9 8340002673129 002673129 8340002673129 FLY.TENT C48702
00450B 618 7105009350422 009350422 7105009350422 COT,FOLDING K42362





Instructions for running Block Builder
1. Construct an input data file with the following fields separated by
spaces: NSN priority-code demand cube,
where priority code is in the set (A,B,C,D). Assume the file is called
"infile"
.
2. Edit the file "setup-block. sen" to suit your preferences,
you might be interested in changing variables such as *env-a*
and 'horizon*, which defines the planning horizon.
In particular,
*env-b*, etc.
3. Start Chez Scheme,
system.
)
with a Unix command like "scheme". (Depends on your
Type the following in Scheme:4. Assume the total volume to be filled is 100.
(load "setup-block. son"
)
(define the-block (make-block 100))
(define items (read-sku-data "infile"))
(build-block the-block items)
5. The last command may take some time, depending on how large the data set
is. When you get the Scheme prompt back (">"), then type the following to
look at ALL the output
:
(the-block 'report-items)
6. You may also ask the-block for the following:
(the-block 'volume-occupied) ; this will be just over the capacity
(the-block 'how-many <NSN>) ; where <NSN> is the NSN of any slat
except you may7. To run another problem, return to step 1 and repeat,
leave Scheme running (i.e. skip Step 3).
8. To quit Scheme, type:
(exit)
9. To run a (long) problem in the background (you may log off of a UNIX
system), add the following to setup-block. scm:
(define the-block (make-block 100))
(define items (read-sku-data "infile"))
(build-block the-block items)
(the-block 'report-items)
and type at the UNIX prompt:
nohup scheme "setup-block. scm" > outfile.dat &
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; ; ; setup file for building supply blocks for deploying MEUs












(load "~ldla fort /model /tables .scm"
)
(load "~/scheme/slib/chez . init"
)
(require 'alist)
(define put-value (alist-associator eqv?))
(define get-value (alist-inquirer eqv?))
(define rem (alist-remover eqv?)
(define increment-value
(lambda (alist key step)
(let ((old-value (get-value alist key)))
(if old-value
(put-value alist key (+ old-value step)
)
(put-value alist key step)))))
(load " inventory. scm"
)
(load "block. scm")
(load " read-data. scm"
(define bignum 1000000)
; ; ; GLOBAL definitions






,- ; Define the planning horizon (in months)
(define 'horizon* 1.0)
,- Uncomment these lines to run a nohup job at the Unix prompt:
(define the-block (make-block 14754))
(define items (read-sku-data "tinput.txt"))
(build-block the-block items)
(the-block 'report-items)
(wrtln (the-block 'volume-occupied) p)
(define test-items
(list
(make-sku 'a 0.7 1 12 1 3)
(make-sku 'b 0.7 1 2 1 12)
(make-sku 'c 0.7 1 2 1 1)
(make-sku 'd 0.8 1 5 1 7)
(make-sku 'e 0.8 1 11 1 4)
(make-sku '
f
1 1 1 1 11)
(make-sku 'g 1 1 1 130)))
READ-SKU-DATA
returns a scheme list of sku's, given an input file:
NSN priority demand cube
(define read-sku-data
(lambda (infile)
(let loop ((data-matrix ( file->matrix "%s %s %f %f" inf lie)
)
(sku-list ' () )
)
(cond ((null? data-matrix) sku-list)
(else
(let ((next-data (car data-matrix)))
(loop (cdr data-matrix)
(cons (make-sku (car next-data)
(cond ((equal? (cadr next-data) "A")
*env-a*)
((equal? (cadr next-data) "B")
•env-b*
)
((equal? (cadr next-data) "C")
•env-c*)
((equal? (cadr next-data) "D")
*env-d*)
(else
(error "Bad env variable"









; ; ; Procedures for inventory calculations
; ; ; for discrete demand distributions
(define expected-fill-rate
(lambda (stock-level prob-fcn)
(let loop ((count 0)
(sum 0)
)
(cond ((> count stock-level) sum)
(else
(loop (1+ count)
(+ sum (prob-fcn count))))))))
EXPECTED-BACKORDERS
finds the expected number of backorders given a current stock level
and probability distn of demand.
(define expected-backorders
(lambda (stock- level prob-fcn) ; prob-fcn takes one arg





(let ( (next -value (* count
(prob-fcn demand) ) )
)
; we check the last two iterations to avoid the anomoly that occur?
,- in prob fens that are not strictly decreasing
(cond ( (and (and (<= last-value last-last-value)
(<= (abs (- last-last-value last-value))
0.0000001)) ; the tolerance
(and (<= next-value last-value)
(<= (abs (- last-value next-value))










(* (expt mean value)
(/ (exp (- mean)
)
(factorial value) ) ) )
)
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; Procedures to build a supply block for deploying Marine CSSE's.
; Based on algorithms given in Sherbrooke (1993)
.
; MAKE-SKU
add weight and upper and lower bounds
identifier

















(let ( (prob-fcn (lambda (level)
(poisson-probability (* 'horizon* demand)
level))))
(expected-backorders level prob-fcn) ) ) )
)
(sku








(<ebo) (ebo (car args) )
)
( (cost-ratio) cost-ratio)
( (set-cost-ratio! i (set! cost-ratio (car args))
( (units) units)
( (add-unit) (set! units (1+ units)))
( (remove-unit) (set! units (1- units)))
(else





: ; defines the supply block
Takes the following msgs
'volume — the total block volume
'volume-occupied -- volume consumed with items
'item-list -- list of items in the block, with quantities (an assoc list)
'add-item <item> -- add <item> to item-list
'how-many <ID> <list-of-items> -- returns the number of units of type <ID>
(define make-block
(lambda (volume)
(let ((item-list '()) ; an association list with key 'ID
(volume-occupied 0)
)
(letrec ( (report -items (lambda ()
(let loop ((items item-list))
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(cond ( (null? items)
)
(else
(let ((next-item (car items)))
(wrttab ((car next-item) 'ID) p)
,- (wrttab ((car next-item) 'demand)




(lambda (msg . args)
(case msg
( (volume) i volume)
( (item-list) item-list)
( (volume-•occupied) volume- occupied)
















(equal? (i ' ID)
(car args)))))))
( (report-items) (report -items)
)
(else
( error ' block "Unknown message" ))))))
block)
)
; ; ; BUILD-BLOCK
; ; ; Adds items to the block to fill its unoccupied volume
(define build-block
(lambda (block candidate-items)
(let ((capacity (block 'volume)))
; procedure to find the item with highest cost ratio
(letrec ((find-max
(lambda (candidate-items)




(cond ((null? items) best-item)
(else
(let ( (next-item (car items) )
)
(if (> (next-item 'cost-ratio) best-ratio)
(loop (cdr items) next-item
(next-item 'cost-ratio))
(loop (cdr items) best- item
best-ratio)) )))))))
,- compute initial ratios for all items
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(let ((next-item (car items)))
(next-item 'set-cost-ratio!
(* (next-item 'priority)
(/ (- (next-item 'ebo 0) (next-item 'ebo D)
(next-item 'cube))))
(loopl (cdr items) ) ) ) )
)
(let loop ((items candidate- items)
)
; if the block is full, then stop
(cond ((> (block 'volume-occupied) capacity))
(else
(let ( (item-to-add (find-max items)))
; add the item with largest cost ratio
(block 'add-item item-to-add)
; recompute ratio for that item
(item-to-add 'set-cost-ratio!
(* (item-to-add 'priority)








returns a vector of expected backorders for an sku having Poisson demand
with mean <demand>.
requires the procedure <infinite-sum> in math.scm




(let ( (prob-fcn (lambda (value)
(poisson-probability mean value) ) )
)
(let loop ((counter 0)
(ebo-vec (make-vector *ebo-vector-range* 0)))






(loop (1+ counter) ebo-vec)))))))
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